Ethnic lineage and religious transmission: The trajectories of ethnic boundary-making among Vietnamese Caodaists living in Cambodia by Thien, Huong Ninh
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethnic Lineage and Religious Transmission: The Trajectories of Ethnic Boundary-
Making Among Vietnamese Caodaists Living in Cambodia 
 
Thien-Huong Ninh 
ninh@usc.edu  
 
 
 
 
**** DRAFT *** PLEASE DO NOT CITE *** 
 
 
 
NINH 1 
On November 28, 2006, Caodaists in Cambodia met with a group of Caodai 
dignitaries and communist cadres from Vietnam to transfer the tomb of the Head Spirit 
Medium Pham Cong Tac from their temple to Toa Thanh Tay Ninh, the “Holy See” of 
the syncretistic Caodai religion in Vietnam. Despite Vietnamese governmental infiltration 
and control over the religious center since 1975, Caodaists at the Kim Bien Temple in 
Phnom Penh remained loyal to Toa Thanh Tay Ninh in their homeland. They believed 
that they were acting in accordance with the wishes of Pham Cong Tac, who wrote in his 
will that he wished to return to his homeland only when it was “free, peaceful, and 
united.” Meanwhile, they turned a blind eye to co-religionists in the U.S. who were 
organizing demonstrations and protests against the event, including a delegation visit to 
King Norodom Sihamoni of Cambodia. 
This paper examines how an immigrant religious congregation rebuilds broken 
networks with its religious center in the homeland after decades of disconnection. It 
addresses four inter-related questions: (1) How is the Caodai temple in Cambodia 
motivated to re-align with the Toa Thanh Tay Ninh, the Caodai Holy See, in Vietnam?  
(2) How does it foster forms of collaborations and negotiate with conflicts? (3) How does 
it shape this homeland orientation within the contexts of Vietnam-Cambodia regional 
politics and transnational relationships with Caodaists in the U.S.? (4) What are the 
implications of this homeland tie on the identity formation of Caodaists in Cambodia?  
The study analyzes preliminary ethnographic data collected in Cambodia (3 
months), Vietnam (5 months), and the U.S. (8 months). Three processes are examined: 
(1) the rupture of religious networks that resulted in the production of alternative axis of 
self-identification; (2) the transplantation of religious activities onto new grounds as a 
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form of ethnic preservation and localization; and (3) the mending and revitalization of 
inter-temple exchanges to mediate ethnic animosity, regional politics, and the global 
forces of capitalism. 
The research reveals creative strategies of survival and self-fashioning grounded 
in religious ideologies. While it shows the socio-political challenges that conditioned 
community fragmentation, the study also challenges state-centered frameworks of 
immigrant integration by highlighting the re-creation and revitalization of cross-border 
religious networks. Three themes are developed in this paper: (1) the significance of 
cross-border inter-temple networks for exposing and traversing asymmetries of power 
(i.e. between migrants and non-migrants, relations among nation-states, etc.); (2) the 
influence of inter-temple relations on democratizing religious practices under the forces 
of economic globalization; and (3) the impact of transnational exchanges between 
religious temples on the reformulation of new notions of cultural or religious citizenship 
within the nation-state, specifically for coalescing de-territorialized identity-based claims 
around ethnicity and diasporic configurations. 
 
Theoretical Orientation 
 
 Migration scholars have generally argued that engagement in cross-border 
activities grounded in religious inspirations is a pathway toward integration for ethnic 
groups. Through this participation, ethnic groups strategically capitalize on their cultural 
assets in order to cope with the challenges of adaptation in the host societies, such as 
exchanging resources with ethnic co-religionists in other countries in order to sustain 
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local congregational activities (i.e. Huynh 2000). As Alejandro Portes (1999) has 
maintained, transnationalism is not a process separate from assimilation but an “antidote 
to the tendency towards downward assimilation” (471). 
However, ethnicity cannot be fully “optional” or “strategic” as long as it is 
racially marked (Omi and Winant 1994).  In the U.S., Vietnamese immigrants can 
“become” more generic Asian Americans, but they cannot simply decide to “become” 
white and access the “privilege” of whiteness (Lipsitz 1998). Similarly, in Cambodia, 
Vietnamese must act, perform, and speak like local Khmers in order to be accepted and 
gain entrance into the local society.  
Diaspora researchers have maintained that religious transnational involvements 
could lead to the formulation of a diasporan identity (i.e. Tololyan 1996).  This is a de-
territorialized group label voluntarily mobilized by members who are dispersed in many 
countries and yet have a shared concern, such as the welfare of their homeland. 
Therefore, unlike ethnic groups that capitalize on transnational engagements in order to 
attain assimilation, diasporas intentionally mark themselves as distinct from the local 
society while they advance their mission across national borders.  
Sheffer (2006) has defined “ethnonational diaspora” as a type of diaspora in 
which members “are united by the same ethnonational origin and who reside permanently 
as minorities in one or more hostlands” (130). The identities of ethnonational diasporas 
are based on non-essentialist primordial elements, myths, psychological factors, and 
interests related to their homelands and members have the capacity to alter them. The 
author has also suggested that ethnonational elements may be only option for certain 
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number of people to form, consolidate, and define their organized cross-border 
collectivity. 
A number of researchers have proposed that Vietnamese immigrants are 
becoming more of a diaspora than an ethnic group headed for assimilation precisely 
because of their strong orientation toward Vietnam. As Ehrentraut (2004) has found, 
Vietnamese in Cambodia do not comprise an ethnic group. He has suggested that they are 
becoming a diaspora because their homeland loyalty continues to intensify with the 
increasing (and ironic) support from the Vietnamese government for their well-being in 
Cambodia. This diasporic identity formation is further strengthened by their legal 
exclusion from Cambodian citizenship. 
In particular, continuing religious practices from the homeland could also 
reinforce gradual diasporization. As Hoksins (2006) has observed, many Vietnamese 
following the indigenous religion Caodaism were not primarily concerned with 
maintaining ties to Vietnam during their early years of arrival in the U.S. They were 
focused on rebuilding their lives in a new country, such as learning English and other 
marketable job skills.  A number of them converted to Christianity because they felt 
obligated to express gratitude to their Christian sponsors. Meanwhile, they were “hiding” 
their homeland-originated religion by practicing Caodai rituals secretly at home.  
However, as they gradually re-established their religious networks, Vietnamese American 
Caodaists began to revitalize and transplant their religion into American soil.  During the 
last ten years, they have pooled enough resources to construct public Caodai temples and 
institutionalized an international organization with a shared concern for religious freedom 
in their homeland (Hartney 2004; Hoskins 2006; 2008). 
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In general, research on Vietnamese in Cambodia is limited, partly because of the 
anti-Vietnamese atmosphere. It has not examined the impacts of cross-border religious 
practices on the identity formation of Vietnamese immigrants in Cambodia.  Do 
homeland-oriented religious engagements enable Vietnamese immigrants to become 
integrated into Cambodian society? Or do they encourage ethnic isolation and 
solidification by rallying an ethnonational diasporic identity on the grounds of religion? 
 
Background to Ethnographic Issues 
  
Caodaism is a syncretistic religion born in Vietnam under French colonialism in 
1926. Its founders were Confucian scholars who grew up under the Buddhist traditions of 
China and wished to create harmony between Eastern and Western religious 
philosophies. Under the conditions of colonialism and contacts with different cultures, 
Caodaism became a popular religion that aimed at uniting people across political, social, 
and ethnic strata under one God. During its first two decades of establishment, the 
religion’s global outreach included exchanges with faithful from France, India, Japan, 
and Cambodia. 
While Caodai theology is the blending of many traditions, the religion’s system of 
organization is similar to that of the Catholic Church.  The Caodai Holy See, located in 
the Tay Ninh province in southern Vietnam and close to the border with Cambodia, is the 
center of authority. It oversees religious activities, from text publications to religious 
ordination, of all Caodai temples throughout Vietnam as well as those in other countries. 
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In 1956, the Head Spirit Medium Pham Cong Tac fled to Cambodia because of 
political conflicts with the Catholic-dominated Ngo Dinh Diem administration. He 
purchased a 180 meters x 60 meters piece of land in Phnom Penh to build the Kim Bien 
Temple as the home of The Caodai Center. The project marked the first time that a 
Caodai institution was being built outside of the religion’s birth country. However, the 
construction was interrupted because his assistant did not obtain a legal building permit. 
After Pham Cong Tac’s death in 1959, King Sihanouk intervened in the matter and the 
Cambodian court allowed the construction to resume in 1962. However, the Kim Bien 
Temple was deserted in 1970, when many Caodaists were repatriated to Vietnam because 
of Lon Nol’s anti-Vietnamese policies. Most of the building was demolished by the Pol 
Pot regime between 1975 and 1978. It was slowly restored beginning in 1982, after the 
fall of the Pol Pot government, as Caodaists from Vietnam began returning to Cambodia  
and re-vived their religious activities. 
Under the conditions of political instability and forced migration, transnational 
relations between the Kim Bien Temple and its Holy See were never fully formalized 
until the turn of the twenty first century, when Cambodia and Vietnam liberalized their 
economies and improved bilateral diplomatic relations. The close Kim Bien Temple-
Caodai Holy See relations caused a rift among Caodaists in the U.S., most of whom had 
fled Vietnam when communists took over country in 1975. They believed that the Caodai 
Holy See is no longer a legitimate religious institution as it has been under the control of 
the Vietnamese communist government. 
Currently, Caodaism has about 3.2 million followers in Vietnam, mostly 
concentrated in the south where they constitute 5-10% of the region’s population 
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(Hoskins 2008). The number of Caodaists in Cambodia is unknown and probably fluid 
because of the continual flow of back-and-forth migration across the border with 
Vietnam. Nevertheless, the Kim Bien Temple in Phnom Penh claims to have 2,000 
members who are mostly Vietnamese. In the U.S., there are approximately 50,000 
Caodaists, the majority of whom are Vietnamese living in California.  Almost all of the 
Caodai followers in these countries are ethnic Vietnamese.  
 
Ethnic Insularity and Isolation 
 
 The Kim Bien Temple was an important sanctuary for Vietnamese immigrants 
and their descendents. During the 1950s and 1960s, it was an important refuge for 
Vietnamese immigrants who sought safety from political and social agitations in 
Cambodia (Ha 2007). Although political instability and forced repatriation during the 
1970s disintegrated the temple’s congregation, community life gradually resumed during 
the1980s when Vietnamese began resettling in Cambodia. Based on interviews and field 
observation, most active members at the Kim Bien Temple were either returning 
Vietnamese who fled to Vietnam in 1970 or new migrants from Vietnam who were 
seeking economic opportunities in Cambodia. Irregular members made up the majority of 
the congregational membership. Most of them either lived in Vietnamese ethnic enclaves 
far from Phnom Penh or travelled from Vietnam for business activities.  
The Kim Bien Temple’s ethnic insularity was solidified under the conditions of 
anti-Vietnamese hostility in Cambodia. Unlike other minority ethnic groups such as 
Chinese, Vietnamese faced ethnic discrimination that restricted them from full 
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participation in Cambodian society (Tarr 1992). They continued to be seen as colonial 
intruders and invaders even though they had lived in Cambodia for as many as four 
family generations. In particular, Vietnamese had been forbidden from receiving 
citizenship that would have facilitated their integration into Cambodian life, such as 
access to public education. Without proper legal documentation and the lack of Khmer 
knowledge, they could not easily find employment, are vulnerable to poverty, and are not 
own property.    
The ethnic marginalization restrained religious life and activities at the Kim Bien 
Temple. By the 1990s, the temple had lost almost ¾ of its purchased land to local Khmer. 
Caodai faithful had to also conduct religious activities privately, such as wearing ao dai 
(the Vietnamese traditional dress worn by all Caodaists during religious rituals) and 
speaking Vietnamese only within the temple’s compound and reserving traditional 
religious instruments exclusively for important ceremonies. Moreover, the economic 
deprivation of Vietnamese Caodaists had also hindered many Vietnamese from fulfilling 
their religious duties and obligations, such as visiting the temple on every first and 
fifteenth day of the lunar month. For example, a Caodaist informed me that a round-trip 
motorbike ride from his village to the temple costs approximately $4.  The price is too 
high for him that he could only afford to visit the temple once a month. 
During the 1990s, as Cambodia aimed to recover from decades of wars and 
transition into a free-market economy, the Kim Bien Temple saw legal opportunities to 
protect its ethnic identity under religious claims. In 1992, Cambodia established the 
Ministry of Religion and Cults to institutionalize transparent mechanism for certifying 
religious groups and safe-guarding their well-being. The initiative removed the control of 
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the Cambodian socialist party over religious life and lessened restrictions toward 
religions. It opened a door for the Kim Bien Temple to register as a religious institution 
and gain legitimacy for Caodaism. 
 
Inter-Temple Collaborations  
 
  The Kim Bien Temple had to establish a formal body of management in order to 
be recognized by the Cambodian Ministry of Religion and Cults. This organization, 
known as the “Management Committee” within the Caodai community, must be led by a 
dignitary appointed by the Caodai Holy See.  The leader and his committee members are 
responsible for getting approval for all religious activities from the religious center and 
following its manadates.  
The Kim Bien Temple was forming the Management Committee during its early 
years of establishment in Cambodia but ceased during the 1970s, when Caodai members 
fled to Vietnam under the heightened anti-Vietnamese atmosphere. Although the temple 
re-opened during the following decade as Caodaists began returning to Cambodia, it 
could not resurrect the Management Committee. It did not have a dignitary among its 
members and was disconnected from the Caodai Holy See, which came under the tight 
control of the newly-installed communist Vietnamese government in 1975. 
 As in Cambodia, Vietnam lax its policies toward religious practices as the country 
liberalized its economy during the 1990s. It institutionalized a system of certification that 
protected “legitimate” religions while suppressing all “superstitious” activities (mê tín dị 
đoan) (Roszko 2010; Bouquet 2010). The change prompted the Caodai Holy See to re-
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write its religious charters in order to compromise state policies, including the 
intervention of the Vietnamese government in religious ordination and the prohibition of 
“superstitious” religious practices such as séances, which Caodaists believe as an 
essential method for communicating with the divine. The Caodai Holy See also 
established the Council of Governance to supervise and report Caodai activities to the 
Vietnamese government. In effect, it re-centralized its authority as the religious center 
and, in principal, has control over all Caodai temples inside and outside of Vietnam. By 
1997, the Caodia Holy See successfully gained recognition for Caodaism as a religion of 
Vietnam (U.S. State Department 2004). 
 The Kim Bien Temple initiated contacts with the Holy See after its recognition in 
1997. Representatives began making regular trips across the Vietnam-Cambodia border 
to meet with the Council of Governance. Among them included Mr. Ngo
1
, who was seen 
by members at the Kim Bien Temple as a potential candidate to lead the establishment of 
the Management Committee. He grew up in a Caodai family in Vietnam and immigrated 
to Cambodia in 1980 for economic opportunities. He obtained Cambodian citizenship 
through his marriage to a local Cambodian woman and, over the years, had become fluent 
in Khmer. His experiences in Vietnam and socio-cultural immersion in Cambodian life 
made him an ideal leader in negotiating cross-border diplomacy and navigating through 
the Cambodian bureaucratic system of legalization. 
In 2002, the Kim Bien Temple established its first Management Committee with 
Mr. Ngo as its president. During the same year, it filed for registration with the 
Cambodian Ministry of Religions and Cults.  A year later, it obtained the formal 
                                                         
1 This is a pseudonym. 
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certification.  In March 2003, the Kim Bien Temple held a grand public celebration of its 
recognition, with the attendance of Cambodian politicians and representatives from the 
Caodai Holy See.  
Under the legal of protection of religious freedom, the Kim Bien Temple became 
shielded from anti-Vietnamese antagonism and emboldened its participation in 
Cambodian society.  Members began wearing Vietnamese traditional costumes and 
speaking in Vietnamese without fear within the temple’s vicinity. In 2003, the temple 
filed a court complaint to demand for the return of land that had been encroached on by 
local Khmer. It was a futile battle since the temple had lost its original documentation of 
ownership during previous decades under the Pol Pot regime. Nevertheless, as Mr. Ngo 
explained, the event energized the sense of community among Caodaists:  “See, the land 
was stolen and now houses and airport had been built on it. To get it back would be very 
difficult. In my opinion and a number of Caodaists here, I wish that our faithful inside as 
well as outside of the country [Cambodia] will work together and pool in our resources to 
get this land back. Otherwise, I only see this place [the Kim Bien Temple] as a small 
community center.  Its future is really beyond my control.” News of the temple’s legal 
defeat came in July 2010 as it had been expected, and yet the court case remained as a 
significant political undertaking by the Caodai community in Cambodia.  
In August 2010, the Kim Bien Temple made another historic achievement. It had 
completed the construction of a palanquin that would be used publicly during funeral 
processions. Caodaists in Cambodia had never been able to pursue such a project because 
their religion had been seen as a colonial intrusion into the Buddhist state (Edwards 
2007). However, under the leadership of Mr. Ngo, local Caodaists as well as co-
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religionists in Vietnam provided full financial contribution to the initiative. The 
palanquin was a symbol of extra-ordinary collectivity amongst Vietnamese Caodaists.  It 
represented another major step of Caodai religious revitalization and transplantation on 
Cambodian soil. 
 
Inter-temple Conflicts  
 
The legal leverage that the Kim Bien Temple garnered from relations with the 
Caodai Holy See was also fraught with conflicts. Many members of the Kim Bien 
Temple believed that the Caodai Holy See has become desecrated under the control of the 
Vietnamese government since 1975. In particular, they maintained that the establishment 
of the Council of Governance in 1977 violated religious charters written by Caodai 
founders. It concentrated Caodaism’s three separate branches of governance (legislative, 
judicial, and executive) into the hands of 12 dignitary members approved by the state 
rather than chosen by the divine through séances.  
The centralization of Caodaism under the control of the Council of Governance in 
turn had restrained the Kim Bien Temple from creating and maintaining ties with co-
religionists in the U.S.  When a delegation of Vietnamese Caodaists from California and 
Texas visited it in 2004 and 2006, the Kim Bien Temple welcomed the visitors and, as a 
friendly gesture, accepted their gift of a statue of Pham Cong Tac.  However, the temple 
could not fulfill the delegation’s request to permanently install the statue on its compound 
because of disapproval from the Caodai Holy See. Mr. Ngo explained, “The Holy See 
informed us that, according to religious laws, only it could house any statue of Pham 
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Cong Tac. It is a blasphemy to have his statue elsewhere.” However, when I asked him 
for the details of the religious laws, he said that the Holy See did not share this specific 
information with him. 
Similarly, in 2006, the Kim Bien Temple could not heed co-religionists in the 
U.S. when they protested vehemently against the transfer of Pham Cong Tac’s remains 
from Cambodia to Vietnam. It had to collaborate with the Caodai Holy See because the 
Council of Governance had received approval and support from the governments of 
Vietnam and Cambodia.  As Mr. Ngo elaborated, “Everything had already been planned 
and so we had no choice but to accept and collaborate with the request [to transfer the 
remains of Pham Cong Tac]. Because of my prayers, along with a number of brothers in 
the Management Council and the Council of Governance, the event went smoothly and 
peacefully. Here in Cambodia they [the government] helped us by providing three ferry-
boats...When we arrived to the other side of the border, our brothers and sisters waited in 
as many as 500, 700 cars….So the Cambodia [government] side helped out a lot with 
security and we did not encounter any problems along the roads…the Vietnamese 
[government] side also supported this effort.” 
The Kim Bien Temple’s relations with Caodaists in the U.S. would threaten 
Vietnam’s national agenda of economic liberalization. Since the country opened up its 
border and entered the free-market economy in the late 1980s, the Vietnamese Caodai 
community in the U.S., the largest one outside of the homeland, had the opportunity to 
scrutinize Vietnam’s human rights records. It remained distant from the Caodai Holy See, 
accusing it as an arm of the Vietnamse government, and developed an independent 
international system of organization. In 1999, a delegation of Caodaists and other 
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religious groups presented their concerns over religious freedom in Vietnam to the U.S. 
Congress. In 2004, the U.S. State Department designated Vietnam as one of the 
“countries of particular concern” because of its violations over religions. 
 Thereafter, Vietnamese government further lax its policies toward religions in 
order to be removed from the blacklist two years later. At the same time, it strengthened 
the grounding of Caodaism in Vietnam in order to counter and divert the political 
leverage of Caodaists in the U.S. In 2007, ten years after Caodaism was recognized as a 
religion, the Vietnamese government officially recognized it as “an indigenous religion of 
south Vietnam” (tôn giáo bản địa) with the publication of Pham Bich Hop’s state-
sponsored work, People of the Southern Region and Indigenous Religions: Buu Son Ky 
Huong – Caodaism – Hoa Hao Buddhism (Người Nam Bộ và tôn giáo bản địa: Bửu Sơn 
Kỳ Hương - Cao Đài - Hòa Hảo).  Although Caodaism has been locally known as a 
domestic religion, this event marked the Vietnamese government’s acceptance and 
celebration of the role of Caodaism in Vietnamese cultural identity. It also re-affirmed 
Vietnam as the root of Caodai religious life and practices, where Caodaists abroad must 
return to be connected to their religion.  
Today, the Caodai Holy See has become a stage for showing Caodaism to the rest 
of the world. Tourists arrive daily on tour buses at 11 a.m. to observe the Caodai noon 
meditation session. In 2010, it granted permission to delegations from Cambodia and 
India to attend the annual Festival of the Great Mother at the Caodai Holy See.  
Members of the Kim Bien Temple negotiated conflicts with the Caodai Holy See 
by evoking the history of affiliation. They recognized their temple as “Model #2,” 
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modeled after the Holy See and was planned as the second largest temple behind only it
2
.  
A Caodaist evoked the history of affiliation: “Our temple is far [from the Caodai Holy 
See] but the Reverence Leader [Pham Cong Tac] came here long time ago to establish the 
Caodai Missionary Center here. The Caodai Holy See is the most important religious site, 
the second is here. The Reverence Leader came here in order to spread the religion.”  The 
Caodai Missionary Center was established in 1933 but was abolished in 1956 because of 
political instability in Cambodia. Since then the Kim Bien Temple was reduced to being 
only a gathering site until 2002, when it re-established formal ties with the Holy See and 
gained recognition as a Caodai religious institution.  
However, by preserving and drawing upon the history of inter-temple ties, 
Caodaists in Cambodia affirmed the Caodai Holy See as the “religious root” [dao goc] 
and the center of authority of Caodaism.  They believed that all Caodaists must show 
submission to it even though it is under the control of the Vietnamese communist 
government. As a Vietnamese Caodai elderly woman shared, “Cardinal Tam is the oldest 
brother of the whole world.”  A Cambodia-born Vietnamese Caodaist similarly echoed, 
“the Kim Bien Temple belongs to the Holy See therefore it must obey the religious 
center…in religion, we must obey the older brother.”  Furthermore, as the center of the 
religion, they believed that the Holy See has global authority over all Caodaists. A 
Caodai elaborated, “[The Holy See] is our religious root. For any country that wants to 
establish Caodaism in its society, it must receive permission from the Caodai Holy 
See…only it could decide…Why is it like this? Because it was established according to 
                                                         
2 In August 2010, I visited the newly constructed Caodai temple in Dalat, Vietnam 
and learned that it is now considered as “Model #2.” 
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divine mandates received by the Reverence Leader [Pham Cong Tac]. No one would dare 
to disobey the orders of any dignitary.” 
From this loyalty and deference to the Caodai Holy See grounded in religious 
ideology, Caodaists in Cambodia expressed sympathy to its conditions under 
communism.   They understood that the Holy See must work with the Vietnamese 
government and not dwell on the history of separation between state and religion.  As a 
Caodaist at the Kim Bien Temple explained, “If we want to do anything, we must present 
a proposal to the Vietnamese government so that they would know.  When they accept it 
and give us permission then we [Caodaists] would proceed….This is different from 
before, when the country was different. Religious groups had authority.  They could do 
anything they wanted and the government did not put its hands in religious issues.  
However, today’s situation is different.” He also acknowledged that the Vietnamese 
government has lessened its grip over the Caodai Holy See, allowing its authority to have 
more independence.  
   
Conclusion: Implications of Inter-Temple Relations for Collective Identity 
Formation Among Vietnamese Caodaists in Cambodia 
 
The inter-temple relation between the Kim Bien Temple and the Caodai Holy See 
had facilitated the transition of Vietnamese Caodaists in Cambodia from being an ethnic 
group toward an ethnonationalist diaspora. As they established ties with the Caodai Holy 
See, these Vietnamese Caodaists were able to gain religious legitimacy in Cambodia.  
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They used the legal recognition of Caodaism to buffer themselves from anti-Vietnamese 
hostility and, in turn, solidified their ethnic boundary under religious claims.  
However, the inter-temple relation had also restricted the ethnonationalist 
diaspora from expanding. As an affiliate of the Holy See, members at the Kim Bien 
Temple had vowed deference to it and must follow its mandates. In particular, they could 
not establish ties with Caodaists in the U.S., who presented as a threat to the authority of 
the Holy See and Vietnam’s economic interests. Consequentially, the Kim Bien Temple’s 
full dependence on the Holy See had re-installed and maintained authority in the diaspora 
at the religious center in Vietnam.  
The homeland orientation is an act of healing for an ethnonationalist diaspora that 
has been traumatized by the history of displacement, isolation, and marginalization. From 
ethnic violence to political persecution throughout the 20
th
 century, Vietnamese Caodaists 
in Cambodia had been fleeing between their host society and homeland, neither of which 
had embraced them fully. These moments of ruptures had broken their inter-temple ties, 
congregational organization, and kinship relations. However, the re-establishment of 
affiliation with the Holy See in Vietnam in 2002 marked the beginning of a new chapter. 
The re-mending of inter-temple relations that breathed new life into Caodaism and 
aspired to bring the rest of the world to the religion’s root in Vietnam. 
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